Introduction
Economics has a long history of using models of preferences. The preferences are conventionally represented by utility functions and their indifference maps. Until recently, the preferences most commonly used have been self-regarding (or "economic man") preferences in which an agent cares about his own material payoffs but is indifferent about the material payoffs of others. There is now a large literature that supports the conclusion that self-regarding preference models are mostly inconsistent with behavior in experiments in which distributional fairness is a salient characteristic. This has motivated the development of new models of other-regarding (or "social") preferences.
We report direct tests of the central properties of recent prominent contributions to modeling social preferences, including inequality aversion models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and a quasi-maximin model (Charness and Rabin, 2002) . The distinguishing characteristic of inequality aversion models is that utility is decreasing with the difference between one's own and others' material payoffs. The distinguishing characteristic of the quasi-maximin model is that utility is increasing with the lowest of all agents' payoffs (the maximin property) and the total of all agents' payoffs (the efficiency property). These distinguishing characteristics of the two types of models provide the basis for our direct tests of the models.
Fairness game data come from experiments with different types of games, including: (a) reciprocal-motivation games, such as the ultimatum game, in which beliefs about others' possible future actions and imputations of the intentions behind their past actions can affect agents' behavior; and (b) simple distribution games, such as the dictator game, in which such beliefs and imputations are irrelevant (within the context of the experiment). The inequality aversion and quasi-maximin models that we test are models of preferences that are not conditional on others' revealed intentions nor beliefs about their future actions. Therefore, it is appropriate to conduct direct tests of these models with experiments involving simple distribution games rather than reciprocal-motivation games. Our tests are conducted with specially-designed dictator games that are constructed to test the central distinguishing characteristics of the models.
Data from the experiments are mostly inconsistent with the inequality aversion and quasimaximin models. Furthermore, the data do not indicate noisy or random behavior by the subjects in the experiments. Instead, the data are mostly consistent with a model of other-regarding preferences with the conventional regularity properties of positive monotonicity and strict convexity (of indifference curves). These data motivate our development of a model of egocentric altruism in which preferences are positively monotonic and strictly convex. This model is applied to data from our four experiments and data from experiments with proposer competition (Roth, et al., 1991) and responder competition (Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere, 1997) .
Our strategy in modeling other-regarding preferences is to implement a unified approach that develops a model that is consistent with behavior in simple distribution games and then generalizes that model to incorporate intentions. This paper focuses on modeling behavior in simple distribution games. We also explain how the model developed here can be extended in a straightforward way to incorporate intentions. This modeling strategy provides a unified approach to modeling behavior in games both with and without reciprocal motivation.
Experiment 1: A Direct Test of Inequality Aversion
Inequality aversion models are based on the assumption that an agent's utility is increasing with her own material payoff but decreasing with the difference between her own and others' material payoffs. For the special case of two agents and (scalar) money payoffs, the fundamental property of inequality aversion models is that the indifference curves have positive slopes in the part of the money payoff space in which the other's payoff is higher than one's own. This property forms the basis of a direct test for inequality aversion.
Experimental Design and Procedures
Experiment 1 involves a dictator game with the following characteristics. Subjects are randomly assigned to pairs. In addition to a show-up fee of $5, each subject in a pair is given an endowment of $10. The "non-dictators" have no decision to make. The dictators are told that they can send zero or a positive amount (in whole dollar units), up to $10, from their endowment to the other person. Each dollar that a dictator transfers to the other person is multiplied by three by the experimenters. The experimental protocol uses double-blind payoff procedures in which neither the other subjects nor the experimenters can identify the individual who has chosen any specific action. All of the features of the experiment, including the equal endowments of dictators and non-dictators, are common information given to the subjects. The experiment procedures are described in detail in Appendix 1. The subject instructions are available on request to the authors. for derivation of these properties of the indifference curves.) This model predicts that the dictator will give 0 dollars to the other subject for the same reason as does the Fehr-Schmidt model: above the 45-degree line, the indifference curves have positive slope whereas the budget line has negative slope.
Predictions of the Inequality-Aversion Models

Subjects' Behavior in Experiment 1
Data from experiment 1 are reported in Figure 3 with the light-colored bars. In this experiment 19 of 30 or 63% of the dictators gave positive amounts to the other person and, hence, exhibited behavior that is inconsistent with inequality aversion. The 63% of dictators who sent positive amounts of money to the other subjects imposed significant costs on themselves to increase inequality favoring others. This behavior is inconsistent with the central distinguishing characteristic of inequality aversion models. The average amount given away by the dictators was $3.60, which gave the average recipient a payoff of $25.80 (= $5 + $10 + 3× $3.60) and left the dictators with an average payoff of $11.40 (= $5 + $10 -$3.60). Furthermore, the behavior of the 37% of subjects who did not give any money to the paired subject can be explained by selfregarding (or "economic man") preferences. Therefore, inequality aversion is not needed to explain the behavior of any subject in this experiment.
Related Experiments
Comparison of data from experiment 1 with data from other dictator experiments provides additional insight into the properties of subjects' preferences. In the (DB1 and DB2) double-blind dictator experiments reported by Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) , the average amount sent to the paired subjects by the dictators was $1. In our experiment 1 dictator game, the average amount sent by the dictators was $3.60. The price to the dictator of buying an additional $1 of income for the paired subject was $1 in the Hoffman, et al. experiment and it is $0.33 in our experiment 1. The implied (arc) price elasticity of demand for increasing the other subject's income is -1.13, a quite reasonable figure.
Other papers that report experimental tests of inequality aversion models (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Deck, 2001; and Engelmann and Strobel, 2004 ) also find that the models' predictions are inconsistent with the behavior of a large proportion of the subjects. Therefore there is a moderately large body of data that are inconsistent with inequality aversion, which suggests the need for a different type of model. After reporting their tests of inequality aversion, Charness and Rabin introduce the quasi-maximin model and apply it to data from several experiments. We next report direct tests of that model. ). The quasi-maximin utility function is assumed to be:
Direct Tests of Quasi-Maximin Preferences
The Quasi-Maximin Model
. The γ parameter measures the relative importance of own money payoff compared to the two other arguments of the utility function. The δ parameter measures the relative importance of these other two arguments, the minimum payoff and total payoff (or "efficiency").
Experiments 2 and 3: Tests of Quasi-Maximin Preferences
The three arguments of utility function (1) suggest the design of two experiments that provide direct tests for quasi-maximin preferences. In experiment 2, we offer subjects choices between alternatives in a dictator game in which the dictator's own payoff and the minimum payoff are constant but the sum of all payoffs changes. The three rows in Table 1 show the choices open to a subject in experiment 2 when the $5 show-up fees are included in payoffs. Because the dictator's payoff is the same in all rows and the lowest payoff is the same in all rows, the quasi-maximin model predicts that an agent will choose row 3, which has the highest total payoff to all agents Whereas experiment 2 tests for a preference for efficiency, experiment 3 tests for the other defining property of the quasi-maximin model, the preference for increasing the payoff to the lowest paid agent (the maximin property). Thus, in experiment 3, we offer subjects choices in a dictator game in which the dictator's own payoff and the total payoff are constant but the minimum payoff changes. The three rows in Table 2 show the choices open to a subject in this dictator experiment when the $5 show-up fees are included in payoffs. Since the dictator's payoff is the same in all rows and the total payoff to all agents is the same in all rows, the quasi-maximin model predicts that an agent will choose row 3, which has the maximin payoff (except in the limiting case in which 0 = γ , where the model makes no prediction because this is the special case of self-regarding preferences). This row 3 prediction is independent of the piece-wise linear form of the Charness-Rabin (2002) utility function. Thus the experiment provides a direct test of the assumed maximin property per se.
Procedures in Experiments 2 and 3
Experiments 2 and 3 have the following characteristics. Subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four that consist of a dictator and three "non-dictators." The dictators are told that they must choose one row from Table 1 in experiment 2 or one row from Table 2 in experiment 3. Different subjects participated in experiments 2 and 3. The experimental protocol uses double-blind payoff procedures in which neither the other subjects nor the experimenters can identify the individual who has chosen any specific action. All of the features of the experiment are common information given to the subjects. The experiment procedures are described in detail in Appendix 1. The subject instructions are available on request to the authors.
Behavior in Experiments 2 and 3
Subjects' behavior in experiments 2 and 3 is reported in Figure 4 . We observe that only 5 of 33 (or 15%) of the subjects chose row 3 in experiment 2, which is the unique prediction of the quasimaximin model. Thus, the behavior of 85% of the subjects in experiment 2 is inconsistent with quasi-maximin preferences. In experiment 3, only 2 of 32 (or 6%) of the subjects chose row 3, which is the unique prediction of the quasi-maximin model. Hence the behavior of 94% of the subjects in experiment 3 is inconsistent with the quasi-maximin model.
The Egocentric Altruism Model
The very high rates of inconsistency between subjects' behavior and the testable implications of the inequality-aversion and quasi-maximin models suggest the need for a model with different properties. As it turns out, the behavior observed in experiments 1-3 can be rationalized by a utility function with the conventional properties of strict quasi-concavity (i.e., indifference curves that are strictly convex to the origin) and positive monotonicity (i.e., increasing) in the dictator's Andreoni and Miller (2002) test data from many dictator games, with varying budgets and own-payoff prices for altruistic actions, for consistency with utility-maximizing behavior by testing the data for consistency with the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP). They report that 98 percent of their subjects make decisions that are consistent with GARP and therefore are, in that specific sense, rational altruists. Furthermore, Andreoni and Miller report that constant elasticity of substitution (CES) parametric utility functions provide a good fit to data for their subjects. We develop a model based on CES utility functions that are modified to capture salient characteristics of subjects' altruistic preferences that are revealed by our experiments. We begin by presenting the two-agent special case of the model. The agent's altruistic preferences are assumed to be "egocentric," by which we mean that between two money allocations (a,b) and (b,a) the agent prefers the one that allocates the larger payoff to himself:
The Two-Agent Egocentric Altruism Model
Together, the assumptions of monotonicity, convexity, and egocentricity imply the following restrictions on the parameters of the utility function:
Differentiation of (2) yields the marginal rate of substitution between y and m:
Statements (4) and (5) 
The Many-Agent Egocentric-Altruism Model
The generalization of the egocentric altruism utility function to 2 ≥ n agents is:
where i x is the money payoff of agent i and i j x j ≠ , is the money payoff of agent j. The egocentric property generalizes to the n-agent case as follows. First define:
for some i and k, and
Then the egocentricity property is
and a, b such that
The parameter restrictions implied by monotonicity, egocentricity, and strict convexity are given by statement (4).
Explanatory Power of the Egocentric Altruism Model
We first show that the egocentric altruism model is consistent with behavior in dictator game experiments 1, 2 and 3. We next report another dictator game experiment (experiment 4) that reveals other properties of subjects' preferences that can be rationalized by the model. Lastly, we show that the model can rationalize data from experiments with proposer competition (Roth, et al., 1991) and responder competition (Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere, 1997) . This procedure provides a check on how robust the model is to explaining behavior in distribution games.
Is the Egocentric Altruism Model Consistent with Behavior in Experiments 1-3?
We first ask whether the behavior of subjects in experiment 1 is consistent with the egocentric altruism model. In other words, are the data from experiment 1 consistent with the two-agent utility function given by equation (2) and the parameter restrictions in statement (4) that are implied by monotonicity, egocentricity, and convexity?
In experiment 1, a dictator can choose a whole dollar amount s weakly between 0 and 10 to send to the paired subject. Each $1 sent decreases the dictator's money payoff by $1 and increases the paired subject's money payoff by $3. Hence, the slope of the dictator's budget line is 3 − above the 45-degree line. Therefore, if the slope of an indifference curve ( MRS − ) at the point (15-1, 15+3), which corresponds to giving one dollar to the other person, is the same or larger than the slope of the budget line ( 3 − ) then the most preferred option for the dictator is to
give at least one dollar to the other person. If this is not true then the dictator's most preferred choice is to give 1 or 0, depending on which of these two (whole dollar amounts) has larger utility. Appendix 3 derives this formally and shows that there exists a function of α , We now ask whether the subjects' behavior in experiments 2 and 3 is consistent with the egocentric altruism model. In other words, are the data from experiments 2 and 3 consistent with the many-agent utility function given by equation (6) , and therefore again row 2 is preferred to row 1 by such a dictator. Similarly, it can be verified that row 2 is preferred to row 3 as well, and therefore the egocentric altruism model predicts that the dictator will choose row 2 in experiment 3. We observe from Figure 4 that 28 of 32 subjects chose row 2 in experiment 3; hence the egocentric altruism model is consistent with the behavior of 88% of the subjects in that experiment.
Experiment 4: How Do Dictators Respond to the Opportunity to Take Money?
A common feature of experiments 1 -3 is that the dictator cannot take money from another subject and appropriate it himself. This means that the designs of those experiments do not cause the subjects to reveal information about some characteristics of their preferences. In order to construct an experiment that will reveal more about the subjects' preferences, we expand the feasible set of experiment 1 to include opportunities to take money as well as give it away.
Experimental Design and Procedures
In experiment 4, subjects are randomly assigned to pairs. Each subject in a pair is given $10 plus a show-up fee of $5. The "non-dictators" have no decision to make. The dictator is asked to decide whether he wants to give up to $10 from his own endowment to the other subject or take up to $5 of the other subject's endowment or neither give nor take anything. Amounts given or taken have to be in whole dollar amounts. Any amount given to the other subject is multiplied by three by the experimenter. Each dollar taken from the other subject increases the dictator's payoff by one dollar; that is, there is no multiplication by three by the experimenter. The experimental protocol uses double-blind payoff procedures. All of the features of the experiment, including the equal endowments, are common information given to the subjects. In summary, experiment 4 differs from experiment 1 only by introduction of the opportunity to take money from the paired subject. The experiment procedures are described in Appendix 1. The subject instructions are available on request to the authors.
Subjects' Behavior in Experiment 4
Data from experiment 4 are reported in Figure 3 with the dark-colored bars. Note that 22 of 32 or 69% of the dictators took money from the other person and 18 of 32 or 56% took the maximum possible amount, $5. Also, 3 of 32 or 9% of the dictators gave money to the other person and 7 of 32 or 22% neither gave nor took any money (they chose $0 as the amount to send or take). Note that 22% of the dictators chose equal payoffs and 78% chose unequal payoffs. − (which is smaller than 1 − ) then so are the slopes at all points with higher y/m. This implies that the optimal choice is to take at least $1. On the other hand if the slope at the payoff vector resulting from giving $1 is larger than 1 − (which is larger than 3 − ) then so is the slope at all points with lower y/m. Hence, in that case, the best choice is to give at least $1. If however, the slope of an indifference curve at the payoff vector resulting from taking $1 is larger than 1 − , and the slope from giving $1 is smaller than 3 − , then the dictator's optimal choice is to take $1, give $1, or choose $0 depending on which of them has the highest utility.
Appendix 3 
Explaining Competition
We next consider the question of how robust is the empirical consistency of the egocentric altruism model with behavior. We here consider experiments that involve competition among the agents on "one side" of the game. Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991) that 72 (resp. 14) out of 158 proposers offered 995 (resp. 1000) at round 10. In that round 2 out of 18 groups are settled in the equilibrium given in part 2.b of Proposition 1. If we allow for an error of two players, that is if at least 7 (resp. 5) out of 9 (resp. 7) offer 995 ) ( * s S − = , then 6 out of 18 groups are settled at the symmetric equilibrium given part by 2.a of Proposition 1. Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere (1997) 
Game with Proposer Competition
Game with Responder Competition
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1)
All responders accept all proposals;
2) The proposer's offer
P s maximizes expected utility function (10).
Data from the experiment show that the percentage of responders choosing 0 thresholds to be 13%, 30% , 40%, 50% and 67% in the first to fifth rounds. Although the responders' behavior has not fully converged by round 5 (the last round), continuation of this monotonic convergence pattern to at least 8 rounds would have had 100% of responders choosing 0 thresholds. Thus the monotonic convergence pattern in the data appears to be consistent with part 1 of Proposition 2. Proposers' behavior does appear to have converged by round 4 because, from the third round on, there is always at least one responder with a 0 (resp. 1) threshold in 10 (resp. 12) out of 12 groups. Therefore, the proposers can be assured that their proposals will be accepted by at least one responder and, therefore, they can choose proposals that maximixe their utility.
The data show that 11 (resp. 8) out of 12 proposers offer at least 5 (resp. 10) French francs, which reveals that proposers have altruistic preferences, because proposers with self-regarding preferences would choose 0 when assured of acceptance by at least one responder.
Concluding Remarks
As shown in Charness and Rabin (2002) , Deck (2001) , Engelman and Strobel (2004) , and section 2 above, a large majority of subjects make choices that are inconsistent with inequality aversion models in dictator game experiments designed to provide direct tests for inequality aversion. As forms was done by the monitor. Because subject decision forms were inside envelopes when they were distributed and collected, not even the monitor could know any subject's personal decision.
The payoff procedure was double blind: (a) subject responses were identified only by letters that were private information of the subjects; and (b) money payoffs were collected in private from sealed envelopes contained in lettered mailboxes. Double blind payoffs were implemented by having each subject draw an unmarked sealed envelope containing a distinctlylettered key from a box containing many envelopes. The subjects wrote their key letters on their response forms; thus payoffs could be correctly made. At the end of the experiment, the subjects used their keys to open lettered mailboxes that contained their money payoffs in sealed envelopes. The experimenters were not present in the mailbox room when the subjects collected their payoff envelopes.
All of the above-described features of the experimental design and procedures were common information given to the subjects before they made their decisions. The subject instructions and response forms did not use evocative labels in referring to the two groups of subjects. Instead, the terms "group X" and "group Y" were used. No subject participated in more than one experiment session.
All of the experiment sessions ended with each subject being asked to earn his $5 showup fee by filling out a questionnaire. Group X and group Y subjects had distinct questionnaires.
The questions asked had three functions: (a) to provide additional data; (b) to provide a check for possible subject confusion about the decision tasks; and (c) to provide checks for possible recording errors by the experimenters and counting errors by the subjects. Subjects did not write their names or any other identity-revealing information on the questionnaires. The additional data provided by the questionnaires included the subjects' reports of their payoff key letters. Data error checks provided by the questionnaires came from asking the group X subjects to report the numbers of tokens sent. These reports, together with two distinct records kept by the experimenters, provided accuracy checks on data recording.
Procedures of Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was a manual (i.e., non-computerized) experiment with a double-blind payoff protocol. Double-blind payoffs could be, and were, implemented in this experiment without the use of a monitor and mailbox payoff procedure because the payoffs to the dictators were independent of their choices.
The subjects first gathered in a room adjacent to the laboratory. The stations in the laboratory were randomly assigned, in equal numbers, to four groups. This was done independently for each experiment session. A large manila envelope containing experiment documents was placed at each station. Subjects entered the laboratory and sat at any station they chose but without any way of knowing which of the four groups that station had been randomly assigned to. Each station had privacy side and front partitions. Procedural instructions were projected on a screen at the front of the room. The dictators were designated group W. The other subjects were designated groups X, Y and Z. The subjects in groups X, Y, and Z were given questionnaires to fill out; in this way it was not clear to other groups during the experiment which of the seats were occupied by individuals randomly assigned to be dictators. After the passage of more than enough time for decisions to be recorded, an experimenter asked from a back laboratory door for everyone who had completed his questionnaire to raise his or her hand. After all hands were raised, two messages were alternated on the projection screen at the front of the laboratory. One message instructed group X, Y and Z subjects to "wait for further instructions."
The other message instructed group W subjects to put all of the experiment material except the disclaimer form and the sealed white legal-size envelope back in the large manila envelope and deposit the manila envelope in a box at the front of the laboratory while exiting. They were instructed that the sealed white envelope contained their payoffs ($10 plus the show-up fee of $5).
These envelopes were sealed and had labels attached on both sides with the instruction "not to open this envelope until after exiting the building." After all group W subjects had exited, an experimenter retrieved the box and took it to the separate rear "monitor" room. The forms with the group W subjects' decisions were extracted. Then the group X, Y and Z subjects were called, one at a time to receive their show-up fees and the payoffs determined by the group W subjects' decisions. This process involved another randomization: the group W subjects' decision forms were applied in random order to determine the payoffs of group X, and Y, and Z subjects. The three screens of projected instructions and the printed instructions contained in the large manila envelopes are available on an experimenter's homepage, as explained in footnote 1.
All of the above-described features of the experimental design and procedures were common information given to the subjects. The subject instructions and response forms did not use evocative labels, such as "dictator" in referring to the four groups of subjects. Instead, the terms "group W," "group X," "group Y" and "group Z" were used. No subject participated in more than one experiment session.
Procedures of Experiment 3
The experiment procedures and subject instructions for experiment 3 were the same as those for experiment 2 except for the use of the payoffs in Table 2 rather than Table 1 .
Procedures of Experiment 4
The experiment procedures and subject instructions for experiment 4 were the same as those for experiment 1 except for minimal changes necessary to introduce the opportunity for group X subjects to take money from paired group Y subjects as well as give them money. 
Indifference Curves for the Bolton-Ockenfels Model
The B&O model is based on a "motivation function" of the form, 
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Proposition 1. Games with Proposer Competition
In the Roth, et al. (1991) 
